As a comparatively cost effective, clean, and safe method of transportation, international shipping offers an important means of moving goods internationally and enables other activities such as leisure cruising.1 Many factors contribute to the development of international shipping. As an example, the evolution of ship propulsion has progressed from sailing ships to steam ships powered by coal and then to an almost universal use of diesel engines, significantly accelerating international trade.2 Similarly, advances in telecommunication and information and communications technology infrastructure, reductions in trade barriers, and low energy costs have also contributed to the expansion of international shipping and seaborne trade.3 However, the increase in fuel consumption associated with increasing seaborne trade has led to a rise in atmospheric emissions from international shipping.
The author would like to thank Robin Warner and Warwick Gullett for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. However, the author takes full responsibility for the content of the article. 1 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Introduction to IMO <http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx>; see also Rajiv Saxena, Overseas Shipping Made Cheaper 42(7) Industrial Engineer 24 (2010) . But see Matthew Stibbe, Shipping Security: All at Sea? 3(2) Infosecurity Today 32 (2006) . Stibbe asserts that marine terrorism makes the shipping costly. 2 Sujith Kollamthodi et al, Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping: Trends, Projections and Abatement Potential: Final Report, at 3 (2008). 3 Ibid. 3 The problem of GHG emissions from international shipping is an issue of international dimension. To unite the international community in addressing this issue jointly, the United Nations has made active institutional and legal responses. The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, together with its Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), Conference of the Parties (COP), and the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), have contributed to the international attempts to address the issue, although the effectiveness of their efforts has been questioned. 10 As a consequence, GHG emissions from international shipping are not regulated by the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. 11 As a specialized agency of the United Nations, the IMO has recognized the problem of GHG emissions from ships and has acted on it based on Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol as well as on the Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO Convention) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 12 In contrast to the efforts made within the UN international climate change regime, there are high expectations of the IMO due to its mandate and strength in regulating GHG emission-related technical matters. In particular, the newly adopted revised Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention) 13 and the guidelines 10 See, eg, Sebastian Oberthür, Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol 3(3) Climate Policy 191, 193 (2003) . Oberthür asserts that parties to the UNFCCC had wide discussions on the GHG emissions from international transport, and its SBSTA has been working on marine bunker fuels. However, under the UNFCCC process, no regulation on shipping GHGs has been achieved. However, see, Bernd Hackmann, Analysis of the Governance Architecture to Regulate GHG emissions from International Shipping 12(1) Int'l Envt'l Agreements: Politics, Law & Economics 85, 90 (2012) . Hackmann claims that the work by the UNFCCC on the issue is still proceeding, and regulating shipping GHG emissions should fall under the scope of the Bali Action Plan. 11 The UNFCCC only requires the regulation of national reduction of GHG emissions from ships, while the Kyoto Protocol requires the IMO to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping. UNFCCC, supra note 5, Article 4(1)(c); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, Article 2(2). 12 A detailed discussion on this issue is provided in the next section. Convention To date, the MARPOL Convention has adopted six annexes produced by the IMO have assured the international community of progress regarding the adoption of energy-efficiency measures. Since these outcomes have been achieved since July 2011, there has not been much scholarly analysis on these rules as yet. Current discussions mainly focus on the institutional interaction 14 between the IMO, the UNFCCC, and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as well as the proposed market-based measures (MBMs) in relation to the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. 15 This article conducts a comprehensive analysis of the IMO's efforts in regulating these issues.
The first part of this article looks briefly at the IMO's mandate for regulating shipping GHG emissions. Having established the central role of the IMO in providing a solution to the problem, the article then examines and assesses the IMO GHG regime from three perspectives, namely the evolution of the regime, Annex VI and its amendments to the MARPOL Convention, and the main outcomes achieved within the IMO. II To cope with the increasingly serious issues of safety at sea and marine pollution, 16 the United Nations Maritime Conference was held in Geneva on 6 March 1948. This conference adopted a convention that formally established the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), which subsequently changed name to the IMO in May 1982. 17 Article 1 of the IMO Convention outlines five purposes of the organization, which can be broadly summarized into its jurisdiction on technical and commercial matters such as discriminatory practices by shipping companies. Due to the possible threat to the practice of free enterprise in the shipping industry from the commercial jurisdiction of the IMO, many states have attempted to limit the purposes of the IMO to technical aspects rather than commercial regulation. Consequently, the IMO has focused primarily on its technical jurisdiction. 18 
Evolution of the IMO GHG Emissions Regime
Although discussions on GHG emissions from ships within the IMO started in the late 1980s, it is generally accepted that the IMO's work on this issue formally commenced in 1997. 42 During that year, the MARPOL Conference not only adopted a protocol on Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention but also adopted Resolution 8 on 'carbon dioxide emissions from ships,' which requested the IMO to undertake a study on GHG emissions from ships and consider feasible carbon dioxide reduction strategies. 43 Following joint efforts by several internationally renowned research institutes, a study of GHG emissions from ships was published in 2000. 44 This study not only answered the question of why GHG emissions from shipping should be reduced, but it also explored how to deal with the issue. It canvassed the reduction potential of different technical, operational, and market-based approaches, which to some extent provide a 'road map' for future policies within the IMO. In 2003, a resolution was adopted by the IMO Assembly on 'IMO policies and practices related to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from ships,' urging the MEPC to 'identify and develop the mechanism or mechanisms needed to achieve the limitation or reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping.' 45 Since then, the MEPC has been working on this issue by means of various negotiations and discussions within its series of session meetings as well as in its GHG-WGs.
The evolution of the IMO GHG emissions regime has been lengthy and intermittent. The debate on the incorporation of either the CBDR principle or the NMFT principle into the reduction of GHG emissions from ships has run through all of the negotiations and discussions within the IMO. The conflict of the two principles has delayed the advancement of the negotiations within the MEPC. 50 To expedite the negotiation process within the MEPC, the fifty-second MEPC meeting adopted a two-step strategy, according to which the MEPC was to deal with all of the technical matters related to GHG limitations or reductions first and then resolve the politically related issues including the application of the CBDR or NMFT principles. 51 However, it has been difficult to separate the two steps. In 2008, the fiftyseventh MEPC meeting adopted nine fundamental principles as a basis for future regulations, emissions from ships should be adopted by consensus, but the debate on this issue has been postponed until the sixty-fifth MEPC meeting in 2013. 64 The energy efficiency measures apply to all ships of 400 gross tonnage and above. 65 Due to the global financial crisis since 2009, this new regulation has imposed a great deal of pressure on global shipping industries, in particular, those from developing countries.
Nevertheless, under Regulation 19, there is flexibility in the application of the EEDI:
Regulation 19
1. This chapter shall apply to all ships of 400 gross tonnage and above … 4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this regulation, the Administration may waive the requirement for a ship of 400 gross tonnage and above from complying with regulation 20 and regulation 21.
5. The provision of paragraph 4 of this regulation shall not apply to ships of 400 gross tonnage and above:
the CBDR principle. 68 In practice, this waiver might be used primarily by ships flying the flags of developing countries due to the much more stringent requirements by developed countries. Nevertheless, prior to the adoption of this amendment, Vanuatu submitted a proposal on possible exemptions from the EEDI requirements for ships trading to the least developed countries and small island developing states, but it was not accepted by the sixtyfirst MEPC meeting. 69 In this sense, this waiver clause could be deemed to be a compromise between developed countries and developing countries. According to an assessment by Lloyd's Register and Det Norske Veritas, the impact of the waiver clause (Regulation 19.5) is estimated to be low on the total emission reduction potential. 70 This is because low compliance costs and the commercial disadvantages associated with non-compliance make it unattractive for flag states or shipowners to opt for an EEDI waiver. 71 Given the situations of the countries supporting this waiver clause, notably Brazil, China, and Saudi Arabia, the most likely level of waiver is only 5 percent. 72 Before the meeting, Vanuatu proposed to include a provision in the draft regulation on an exemption for these vessels trading to least developed countries and small island developing states (SIDS). However, the committee did not agree with the proposal on the grounds that the adoption of this provision could mean that 'the least efficient ships would serve these trades/routes indefinitely' and would prejudice the benefits of developing countries due to higher transportation costs resulted as such. 70 71 Ibid, Appendix 1, 1-3. Appendix 1 of the report analyses that technology cost of compliance to EEDI will be low due to such factors as EEDI reference lines, ship hydrodynamic optimization, and preparation for future more stringent Phases 2 and 3; and an EEDI non-compliance ship is projected to suffer from certain commercial costs including higher ship fuel cost, cost of re-verification, second hand value, opportunity costs, and charter-ability. 72 Ibid. According to the report, these three countries supported the waiver clause at the sixtysecond MEPC meeting. If the waiver will be taken up by these countries, as of December 2019), a carbon dioxide reduction level of 10 percent is mandated, and this percentage will become higher every five years to be in line with updated technological developments in efficiency and reduction measures. In Phase 3 (1 January 2025 onwards), a 30 percent reduction is set for most ship types calculated from a reference line for ships built 82 Ibid at 12. 83 Ships with non-conventional propulsion systems refer to ships with diesel-electric propulsion, turbine propulsion, and hybrid propulsion. 84 These technologies can be classified into five groups, namely:
• ship capacity enhancement;
• hull and propeller;
• engines, waste heat recovery, and propulsion system;
• alternative fuels; and
• alternative sources of energy. 90 89 Ibid at 14-15. EEDI Calculation Guidelines, supra note 73. 90 Ibid. Compared with the seven types of technologies available for new ships as indicated in the first IMO GHG study, there are currently more choices available for the shipping industry. 91 It is projected that during Phases 0 and 1 (1 January 2013-31 December 2019), hull, propeller, and main engine optimization will contribute more to EEDI compliance, while during Phases 2 and 3 (1 January 2020 onwards), new technologies and design speed reduction will be utilized more to meet the EEDI requirements. 92 
B. Operational Measures
The SEEMP is the operational measure regulated by Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention, and it constitutes the other component of the energy efficiency measures besides the EEDI.
This plan provides a flexible mechanism for shipowners and ship operators to monitor ship and fleet efficiency performance over time in a cost-effective manner. The main objective of the plan is to minimize shipping GHG emissions by means of reducing fuel consumption, 98 while the energy efficiency operational indicator (EEOI) is often utilized as a monitoring tool and to establish benchmarks related to the ships' energy efficiency. 99 A well-implemented SEEMP might lead to enhanced technical and operational management as illustrated earlier in the first category. 104 The second and third categories, however, are less influenced by the SEEMP since they involve many stakeholders, which makes their implementation rely heavily on the co-operation of many people and groups.
C. Assessment of Current Technical and Operational Measures
As the first ever mandatory and legally binding energy efficiency standards, 105 Meanwhile, the cost of EEDI compliance for an 'average ship' will not be significant, although this cost will be higher in Phase 2 and 3 than in Phase 0 and 1 due to possible investment on design-speed reduction. 109 Therefore, the overall carbon dioxide reduction resulting from the implementation of current technical and operational measures will be not only 'positive' but also economically sound for the shipping industry.
Both the EEDI and the SEEMP highlight the importance of safe navigation of ships while also improving the energy efficiency of shipping. 110 under the EEDI and the SEEMP. The shipping industry can freely choose the technologies provided that they meet the requirements. This 'freedom from prescription' approach is vital for the success of this mechanism on the ground that it was strongly supported by the global shipping industry before it was adopted by the IMO. 112 Since it is almost impossible to implement these IMO instruments, including the technical and operational measures, without compliance by the shipping industry, their active participation is essential.
Another example of these efforts is the negotiation on the possible approval of the Through this regulation, the IMO attempts to exclude unilateral actions by port states in dealing with shipping GHG emissions. Nevertheless, it will be beneficial for the global reduction of GHG emissions from ships if some states take further steps in this regard. It is also believed that potential regulatory competition between different institutions will provide a significant motivation for the IMO to facilitate its work. 117 The SEEMP is introduced as representing a reduction measure for existing and new ships. Basically, it is a management scheme that entails no reduction requirement at all. To a significant extent, the lack of reduction target setting and monitoring reduces the effectiveness of the SEEMP. 120 This deficiency needs to be rectified by means of other incentives to be provided. 121 It is also recommended by an IMO assessment report that EEOI should be encouraged or mandated as a performance indicator for the SEEMP rather than remain as a voluntary provision. 122 Another challenge comes from the future enforcement of these measures by developing countries that opposed the adoption of the measures. Regulation 23 of Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention underscores the promotion of technical co-operation and transfer of technology, aiming to strengthen the capacity building of developing countries.
This mechanism, if well designed, could be regarded as a kind of differentiated treatment.
Since common responsibility and differentiated responsibility are two core elements of the CBDR principle, and common responsibility has been incorporated in this context via the NMFT principle, 123 the proper design and implementation of the technical co-operation and transfer of technology elements of this mechanism might constitute the application of the CBDR principle. However, Regulation 23 lacks 'concrete obligations' on any state 124 and stipulates that this technical co-operation is subject to national laws, regulations, and policies. 125 It is expected that the transfer of technology from developed countries to developing countries will not be straightforward due to various domestic regulations on intellectual property protection in developed countries. 126 In developed countries, most energy-efficient technologies are owned by private shipping companies. Therefore, how to achieve the successful transfer of technologies in a cost-effective manner remains a difficult question. 
A. The Necessity of MBMs in Reducing Shipping GHG Emissions
In economics theory, the emergence of MBMs has been interpreted as an approach to overcome the problem of environmental externalities. 132 MBMs are one of the main types of environmental policies, 133 and they have been employed by many countries to regulate adverse environmental impacts resulting from anthropogenic activities. As defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), [MBMs] seek to address the market failure of 'environmental externalities' either by incorporating the external cost of production or consumption activities through taxes or charges on processes or products, or by creating property rights and facilitating the establishment of a proxy market for the use of environmental services. 134
MBMs can be classified into three groups, namely environmental fees (contribution), tradable permit (allowance) schemes, and liability rules. 135 Nevertheless, there is no 'one-size-fits-all' MBM. In practice, different MBMs provide solutions for different problems, and some issues might need a mix of two or three types of MBMs.
In the context of GHG emissions from shipping, MBMs can be designed to internalize the external cost of GHG emissions from international shipping by means of a GHG fund or different emission trading schemes. However, the first step is to decide whether MBMs are needed for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. It is a difficult question. Many developing countries, in particular China, India, and Brazil, oppose the adoption of any MBMs. Their argument has mainly been underpinned by three reasons. One is the uncertainty associated with MBMs, including those of the carbon market, the calculation of the emissions from international shipping, and the effect of a carbon tax on ships on the export industry as well as on the future development of the shipping industry and 132 Environmental externalities 'refer to the economic concept of uncompensated environmental effects of production and consumption that affect consumer utility and enterprise cost outside the market mechanism.' OECD, Table 2 ). This proposal measures the amount of pollution by the amount of fuels consumed, which due to different ship types and operational methods may not be accurate. In this case, it actually leads to differentiated treatment of different ships, While intensive discussions on MBMs have been held within the IMO, it is predicted that a form of MBM will be adopted in the near future by the IMO or other international institutions to reduce emissions from ships. First, as discussed earlier, to achieve absolute emission reduction using EEDI and SEEMP alone is not possible in practice, which has been proven by a number of scenario modellings, revealed in many assessment reports. 141 Moreover, the EEDI and SEEMP regulations only entered into force on 1 January 2013, so in practice their compliance by various states and their emissions reduction potential cannot be identified in the short term. The shipping industry has recognized the deficiencies of these measures and relevant work on their improvement has been conducted within the IMO. However, given the intricacies of ship types and shipping features, a technical breakthrough is hardly likely to be achieved soon. Currently, global emissions are 'considerably higher' than the level consistent with the 2 degree Celcius target in 2020, and this trend continues. 142 Under the circumstances, it is necessary for the international shipping industry to explore and discuss the possibility of adopting MBMs for more GHG reduction rather than waiting for the effects of applying energy-efficiency measures to be practically identified. Second, it is technically possible to incorporate the CBDR principle into a future MBM, and proposals applying the principle have been submitted to the IMO by different countries and NGOs. 143 As shown in the comments by some developing countries, the core debate within the MEPC lies in the ignorance of the CBDR principle reflected in many MBM proposals. Once this problem is resolved, it may be possible to adopt MBMs that are accepted by most countries. It seems that any MBM proposal that ignores the CBDR principle would be hardly feasible on the ground that the CBDR principle in the shipping context has been supported by 'the majority of delegations' within the MEPC. 144 In recent years, some international shipping organizations, as well as the shipowners' associations in states listed in 141 Bazari and Longva, supra note 70 at 8, executive summary. 142 The possible adoption of MBMs could reduce shipping GHG emissions in two respects: in-sector reduction and out-of-sector reduction. 146 In the first case, a MBM may provide an economic incentive (for example, a charge on fuel, a refund to 'good performance ships') for the shipping industry to reduce its fuel consumption. The industry might invest in more fuel efficient ships or technologies or operate ships in a more energy-efficient manner.
In the second case, the money collected from a MBM could be utilized to reduce GHG emissions outside the marine sector. In this way, growing shipping emissions could be offset by emission reduction in other sectors.
B. The Feasibility and Impact Assessment of MBM Options
In order to adopt a MBM for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping, it is important to know what choices exist and whether they will have adverse impacts on the shipping industry and different countries, in particular, developing countries. Based on these analyses, the selection and adoption of a suitable MBM is possible. Currently, there are seven types of MBM proposals being discussed and debated within the IMO. A brief introduction of these proposals is illustrated in focused on in-sector and out-of-sector reduction, as indicated in Table 2 . 147 This grouping is based on the areas in which the reduction of GHG emissions from ships will mainly take place and has received many comments on their strengths and weaknesses from different delegations. 148 This section divides these MBM options into three groups. They are environmental fee-related MBM proposals, tradable permit scheme-related MBM proposals, and hybrid MBM proposals. of carbon dioxide and on the amount of emissions. 149 The higher carbon price generally indicates more reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. 150 In this case, the carbon price, or the 'contribution,' is actually a levy on fuel since it has to be imposed on ships if these MBMs apply. 151 In this way, the shipping GHG emissions could be reduced, and the revenues raised could be utilized to either compensate developing countries or reduce out-of-sector emissions through purchasing 'offsets.' Nevertheless, the utilization of revenues for reducing out-ofsector GHG emissions does not indicate that in-sector emission reduction is less significant.
Rather, it is because the in-sector reduction can be achieved through the collection of a contribution or levy. 152 Since shipowners generally respond to prices quickly, this proposal seems feasible and easy to implement. 153 The main concern about this proposal lies in its dealing with revenue and how the special conditions of developing countries are taken into account. There might be another concern about the increased cost, including the extra administrative burden, associated with the GHG Fund proposal. The Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment Report, undertaken by the Expert Group and commissioned by the IMO, provides a comprehensive assessment of proposed MBMs. This report reveals that the increased cost for the GHG Fund is the lowest among the current MBM proposals except for the Penalty on Trade and Development proposed by the Bahamas. 154 The Port State Levy proposed by Jamaica levies a uniform emissions charge on all vessels calling at ports, based on the amount of fuel consumed by the vessels on their voyage to that port. Technically, this option can be easily implemented and is consistent with the polluter pays principle due to its inclusion of all emissions produced by the ship during that journey. However, as mentioned earlier, this option might neither be accurate nor fair for all ships since it measures the ship's actual emissions solely by the fuels that have been consumed. This measurement ignores other pertinent parameters and, thus, is not conducted in a 'cost-effective' manner. 155 Meanwhile, since port states play a crucial role in the enforcement of this MBM, it is important to ensure that all port states, including those that choose not to participate in the system and those that lack proper monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, collaborate in implementing it. 156 Otherwise, some ships may opt for routes through ports that lack monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to avoid the levy. This may lead to competitive distortion, distortion in trade flows, and a non-level playing field among shipping companies and ports. Additionally, under this scheme, the increased cost option is estimated to be the highest among current MBM options. 157 At the sixty-fourth MEPC meeting, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) announced that its preferred MBM is a levy or compensation fund-based system and should directly relate to the actual fuel consumption of individual ships in service. 158 This preference has also been followed by the shipping industries in some countries such as Greece and Korea. 159 The penalty on trade and development proposal by the Bahamas aims to reduce shipping GHG emissions through the imposition of a penalty (cost) and insists that such costs should be proportionate to the GHG emissions from international shipping. To achieve this goal, it seeks to collect emission statistics from either the EEOI or ship funnels using a suitable sensor. According to the proposal, the ship is required to submit data to its flag state or recognized organization for annual verification. Under this scheme, no extra cost would be generated, but the main problem is that the EEOI is not available for all types of ships, and, currently, EEOI baselines are also 'impossible' to establish. 160 The application of this proposal to the GHG issue will not be feasible if this problem cannot be resolved. There are significant challenges in implementing these ETS proposals for international shipping. First, significant carbon leakage and distortion of competition risks exist under the current ETS proposals. Carbon leakage generally refers to differentiated carbon policies and their subsequent impacts on GHG emissions. 163 Since carbon leakage might hinder the success of a global GHG emissions reduction and thus distort global competition, it is important for the ETS to be applied to the international transportation sector, including international aviation, rather than solely to the shipping industry or even part of the shipping industry. 164 The Norwegian ETS provides two exemptions from applying the scheme, namely ships below certain sizes and ships on international voyages to small 160 island developing states (SIDS). 165 While it is a common practice within the IMO regime to set a threshold for ship size, the design of the voyage exemption was to meet the needs of developing countries. However, this regulation may also make it possible for some shipowners or ship operators to opt for certain ship sizes or certain shipping routes through the SIDS in order to get emission exemptions. In this case, competition will be distorted, and the reduction goal may also be hard to achieve. Second, compared with the GHG Fund proposal, an ETS incurs much higher administrative costs to track, monitor, and enforce as well as to avoid evasion and fraud. Last but not least, the current situation, in relation to the EU ETS generally, provides more uncertainty for the future development of an ETS for international shipping. As discussed earlier, the inclusion of the emissions from the international aviation industry into the EU ETS was suspended in December 2012, which, to some extent, makes the ETS less attractive for the shipping industry. Currently, international shipping organizations are generally against an ETS, whereas the shipping associations in some of the Annex I states to the UNFCCC support it. 166 iii. Hybrid MBM proposals Of the seven types of MBM proposals, the Efficiency Incentive Scheme, Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading, and Rebate Mechanism belong to the category of hybrid MBM proposals.
The Efficiency Incentive Scheme and Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading can be regarded as hybrid MBMs with the EEDI as a benchmark, whereas the Rebate Mechanism is a hybrid MBM that can be built into any other MBM. One common feature between the Efficiency Incentive Scheme and Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading is that they both reward good performance ships in their own way, and the EEDI is used for measurement. However, it is the EEDI that makes the two hybrid MBM proposals less attractive. Two factors contribute to this argument. First, low EEDI indicates high energy efficiency, whereas a ship with a low 165 EEDI does not necessarily mean that it has the lowest GHG emissions. 167 Its emissions might be more than those from a ship with a larger engine (high EEDI), which it needs to maintain certain speed to ensure safety in bad weather. 168 In this case, the EEDI measurement does not work well. Second, the two hybrid MBM proposals, if adopted, will apply to both new ships and existing ships, whereas the EEDI adopted by Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention applies to new ships only. 169 To date, there has been no research indicating the possible application of the EEDI to existing ships. After testing and verification, the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners asserts that the EEDI 'does not apply to, and hence it cannot and should not be used for, existing ships.' 170 Therefore, the adoption of these hybrid MBM proposals is not straightforward.
The Rebate Mechanism consists of two options: an add-on option by integrating with any revenue-raising MBM and an integrated option incorporated with the International Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme, which is a levy-on-fuel scheme. The main feature of this hybrid MBM is its compatibility with the CBDR principle. Under the add-on option, all ships pay for their emissions. However, a developing country obtains an annual rebate based on its share of global seaborne imports first, and then the remaining revenue from developed countries will be disbursed through the UNFCCC. In this way, the 'no net incidence' on developing countries can be ensured. 171 In other words, developing countries will not suffer any loss, but they will benefit from participating in the Rebate Mechanism. The first draft of the legal text for the Rebate Mechanism was submitted to the sixty-fourth MEPC meeting by the World Wide Fund for Nature in October 2012, and it stipulates that 'each Party not included in annex II of the UNFCCC, or any successor annex, shall be eligible to an apportioned rebate [from a potential MBM Convention],' and this rebate could be foregone as its contribution to international co-operation. 172 This proposed regulation expands the scope of the beneficiaries of this scheme from SIDS and least developed countries as proposed by some countries to all non-Annex II states to the UNFCCC. It is expected that this mechanism will be attractive for developing countries due to its incorporation of the CBDR principle.
Compared with other proposals, this proposal better reflects the interests of both developing countries and developed countries. Nevertheless, if the add-on option is built into any other MBM proposal, such as a GHG Fund or ETS, the administrative costs will probably be higher due to the possible increased number of administrative bodies. Therefore, it will be very challenging to control these costs. Furthermore, in terms of calculating a developing country's share of global imports by value, whether the available data are accurate and reliable, is another concern.
IV. CONCLUSION It has been a challenge for the international community to provide globally uniform regulations for reducing GHG emissions from international shipping that are acceptable to both developing countries and developed countries. Since the IMO has been mandated to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping, the challenge becomes whether both the CBDR and the NMFT principles can and should be applied to the issue under discussion.
From an international law perspective, the IMO Convention and UNCLOS provide the IMO with general competence to regulate the GHG issue, while the Kyoto Protocol provides the IMO with a specific mandate to regulate this matter. These competences make it possible for the IMO to apply both principles in addressing GHG emissions from ships.
Recently, after a long-term deadlock, the IMO has partially regulated the GHG emissions by adopting mandatory technical and operational measures in its amendment of Annex VI to the MARPOL Convention. This regulation ensures significant emissions reduction and provides a strong incentive for the shipping industry to update cost-efficient technologies. However, the limited EEDI coverage and the lack of a SEEMP reduction target need to be addressed. In particular, the lack of full incorporation of the CBDR principle makes the future enforcement of this regulation questionable particularly for developing country fleets.
In furtherance of reducing GHG emissions from ships, the IMO has organized various discussions and negotiations on potential MBMs. Of the current seven types of MBMs proposed to the IMO, each of them has its pros and cons. Generally, the GHG Fund has low administrative costs and has been welcomed by most of the shipping industry, whereas the Rebate Mechanism serves as the only MBM that properly incorporates the CBDR principle.
As a widely discussed option, an ETS has been opposed by the global shipping industry, but it has been supported by the shipping industry in some of the UNFCCC Annex I states.
However, as all of these proposals are still under further development, it is important to ensure that the MBMs to be adopted should be cost-effective and take the interests of developing countries into account.
